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Chapter 7
Pension Payouts in Chile: Past, Present,
and Future Prospects
Jose Ruiz and Olivia S. Mitchell
Chile’s funded individual-account defined contribution (DC) pension sys-
tem, launched in 1981, remains vibrant after almost thirty years. Over the
Chilean system’s first two decades, analysts and policymakers devoted most
of their attention to questions pertaining to coverage, contributions, and
investment portfolios. Now, however, as the system moves toward maturity
and retirees are increasingly claiming pensions under the program, policy-
makers are beginning to pay attention to how retirement benefits will be
paid.
The goal of this chapter is to review recent developments in the payout
market for Chilean pensions, focusing particularly on the role of annuities,
and to illustrate what makes the payout market in Chile so different from
those in other nations. In what follows, we first offer a brief summary of the
Chilean DC pension system as it evolved since 1981. Next, we focus on how
participants may elect to take their pension benefits, alternatives that
include both a phased withdrawal option and a life annuity. Last, we offer
some thoughts on the nature of the Chilean annuity market and discuss
prospects for the future.
An overview of the Chilean defined contribution
pension system
Chile first instituted a government-run old-age system in the 1920s;1 in the
mid-1950s, this had evolved into three main pension funds organized on
occupational lines: one covered most salaried workers, another covered the
police, and a third applied to members of the armed forces. Thereafter,
additional occupational systems were added, so by the end of the 1970s, the
retirement system was a patchwork of more than 150 individual and quite
fragmented defined benefit (DB) regimes. This structure produced incom-
plete coverage (generally attributed to evasion of contributions), as well as
low and uneven benefits; ultimately the structure was plagued by massive
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financing problems. By the end of the 1970s, government subsidies worth
2 percent of GDP were needed to finance the system, and prospects for
additional problems loomed.
When Pinochet’s military government determined to overhaul the
system in the early 1980s, it first raised retirement ages, boosted contribu-
tion rates, and eliminated some special schemes. Thereafter, it created the
new pension system in 1980, after closing the old systems to new workers
who then were required to contribute to a funded DC individual account
program.2 The new mandatory structure was very much in keeping
with World Bank recommendations for a multi-pillar arrangement
(World Bank 1994). The first-pillar program included a noncontributory,
publicly financed, means-tested, pay-as-you-go (PAYGO) welfare-based
pension (pension asistencial, or PASIS) for the indigent. There was also a
state-guaranteed minimum pension guarantee for workers who contribu-
ted twenty years into the new DC program but nevertheless ended up with
benefits below the government-decreedminimum. The second pillar of the
Chilean pension system, by far the better-known feature, consists of a
national contributory DC program known as the AFP program, mandatory
for wage and salary workers; affiliation remains optional for the self-em-
ployed.3 All covered workers must elect one of the privately managed
pension funds, and contribute 10 percent of their monthly earnings to
that retirement fund, along with an additional contribution (2–3 percent
of monthly wages) to cover administrative costs as well as disability and
survivor insurance.4 Workers can switch between AFPs with advance notice
but must hold all of their balance with a single AFP at any given time. At the
outset, only government bonds were available for the investment portfolios,
and more recently the AFPs have been permitted to offer five funds in the
target maturity date spirit. This approach automatically moves workers’
assets into more conservative investments as they grow older. There is
also a small third pillar in the Chilean system, also an individual funded
DC component. In essence, any worker electing to contribute more than
the mandated 10 percent amount to his AFP may do so, thus obtaining
some additional tax benefits. Relatively few people add additional voluntary
contributions in practice.
Figures 7.1 and 7.2 show the time trend in the size of assets under
management in the Chilean AFP system, along with the number of con-
tributors and retirees. Figure 7.3 shows the number of people by age
claiming different types of pension benefits. We observe that the asset
base has been increasing at a rate of over 9 percent per year, such that
the pension system now amounts to more than 60 percent of the Chilean
GDP. The number of pensioners in the system is around 640,000, of which
37 percent are early retirees, 28 percent are normal retirees, and 35 percent
are disability retirees (the latter number is relatively high inasmuch as any
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Figure 7.1 Growth of the Chilean AFP pension system. Source : Superintendencia de
Valores (2010a).
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Figure 7.2 Time pattern of affiliates and retirees in the Chilean AFP system.
Source : Superintendencia de Pensiones (2010c).
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young system will tend to have a high proportion of disabled participants
relative to regular retirees during the early years).
Retirement benefits payable in the Chilean
pension system
At retirement, retirees may use their accumulated funds to determine their
retirement payout streams. Women may begin their ‘normal’ payout at age
60, while men must wait until age 65; under certain circumstances (to be
explained later), a worker may elect to begin his payments as young as age
55 if he is entitled to receive ‘early’ payments. Unlike in some countries,
receiving the pension does not require one to completely withdraw from
the labor force, so some workers remain employed while collecting a
pension.
Phased withdrawal payments
The main options for retirement payouts from the AFP system are either
(a) a ‘phased withdrawal’ (PW) benefit, or (b) a life annuity payout.5
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Figure 7.3 Chilean retirees by type, over time. Source : Superintendencia de Pen-
siones (2010a).
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In the case of the PW approach, the retiree retains his assets invested at his
AFP, whereupon the fund administrator sets the payout according to a
government formula that converts the balance into a monthly payout that
takes into account the retiree’s age, sex, and marital status. Specifically, the
PW benefit paid to retiree i in year t is given by:
PWi;t ¼ Balancei;t12 NCUi;t ð1Þ
where PWi,t is the monthly benefit under the PW system which depends on
Balancei,t or the amount he accumulated in the fund as of his retirement
date, and NCUi,t refers to the government’s estimate of the ‘necessary
capital’ required to finance one unit of pension payout, given the retiree’s
sex, age, and family composition (Pino 2005). The NCU term therefore is
an annuity factor converting the worker’s accumulated pension balance
into a periodic payment.
Survivorship pensions are required by law. If the pensioner is male, his
widow will receive 60 percent of his pension if he lacks children eligible for
survivorship benefits. In the case that a decedent leaves dependent chil-
dren, his widow would receive 50 percent of her deceased husband’s
pension while each child receives an additional 15 percent of the benefit.
If the pensioner is female, a survivorship pension was paid only to her
dependent children and to her surviving husband only if he is disabled.6
When the AFP payouts first started, the government lacked good
information about workers’ survival patterns in retirement. As a result,
US annuitant actuarial tables (with some setbacks) were initially used to
project PW amounts. Yet, people with very low balances do not purchase
annuities, so using annuitant tables to compute payouts for those taking
PWs likely overestimated their life expectancies. Over time, new mortality
tables for Chile (RV-2004) were devised, based on actual annuitant
mortality patterns over the period 1995–2003. Each retiree’s PW amount
is also recomputed each year using updated mortality patterns and life
years remaining, producing a decreasing pattern of real payouts over
time.7
As with all PW programs, the retiree who elects the PW option retains
ownership of his AFP balance as long as it is positive, but he faces both
investment risk and longevity risk in that the balance might decline to
zero. At the point of converting to the PW mode, the retiree is also
charged a flat fee as a percentage of the payout amount (this is current
practice; prior to 1987 commissions on assets under management were
charged). The AFPs could charge commissions based on a worker’s
retirement accumulations, but the regulator subsequently prohibited
balance fees. As of 2010, the average PW monthly payment for a retiree
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claiming at the normal retirement age was US$232 and US$556 for
the early retiree (Banco Central de Chile 2010; Superintendencia de
Pensiones 2010a).
Lifetime annuities
Alternatively, a retiree may use the balance in his account to purchase a
lifetime payout annuity from a life insurance company. The advantage of
annuitizing one’s retirement wealth is that the retiree is protected against
both mortality risk and capital market risk. Yet, there is a downside: he loses
liquidity as he must relinquish the entire capital accumulation to the
insurer. In principle, retirees could opt for both a PW and annuity payment,
but in fact most retirees take either the immediate annuity or the PW,
perhaps combined with a deferred annuity.
In all cases, the retiree purchases his annuity benefit from a life insurance
company where he relinquishes his pension fund and pays a commission
(2 percent of the balance or less) in exchange for a lifelong annuity
expressed in UFs (Unidad de Fomento), a standard numeraire for inflation-
indexed payments widely used in Chile.8 The annuity benefit continues until
the retiree’s death, and if there are dependents, for as long as the latter
are eligible. There is, of course, some risk that buyers may suffer from
insolvency of the life insurer which sold the life annuity. In such an
eventuality, the Chilean Superintendencia de Valores is authorized to
conduct a public auction to seek to recapitalize the failed company; all
participating life insurers estimate the number of periods during which
they will continue paying 100 percent of the promised pension annuity
amounts. The life insurer offering the longest contract period wins, and
after this, the government guarantees continued benefits up to a cap from
general revenue.9 As of 2010, the average monthly annuity payment
benefit for a retiree claiming at the normal retirement age was 11.4 UF
(US$458) and for the early retiree, 10.6 UF (US$426).10
Table 7.1 provides a descriptive overview of the key features that distin-
guish the PW form of benefit and the annuity modality. Clearly, the PW
approach affords more liquidity but more longevity and capital market risk;
the Immediate or Deferred Annuity approach protects against outliving
one’s assets, but it offers little to no bequest potential.
Figure 7.4 shows the time trend of the fraction of Chilean retirees taking
an annuity versus a phased withdrawal. Of particular interest is the time
path of annuitization adoption: after only a few years of the system’s
inception, already one-quarter of pensioners had elected the immediate
annuity option, and today close to 60 percent of retirees have taken the
immediate life annuity. It is in this sense that the data show quite high levels
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Table 7.1 Characteristics of alternative payout modes under the Chilean retirement
system
Payout structure
Attribute
Phased
withdrawal
(PW)
Immediate
annuity (IA)
Temporary withdrawal
(TW) and deferred
annuity (DA)
Managed by AFP Life insurance
company
AFP and life insurer
Can payout be changed Always No DA can happen earlier
Who controls funds Retiree Life insurer Retiree (TW) and life
insurer (DA)
Benefit amount Variable Constant or variable Variable and constant
Eligible for MPG Yes Yes Yes
Bequest feasible Yes No Only for TW
Source : Authors’ calculations; see text.
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Figure 7.4 Fraction of retirees taking an annuity, phased withdrawal (PW), or
temporary withdrawal (TW). Source : Superintendencia de Pensiones (2010a).
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of annuitization in Chile, consistent with others’ reports on the time trends
(James et al. 2006; Rocha and Thornburn 2006; Thorburn et al. 2007).
Figure 7.5 shows the time path of benefit streams under both the PW
and the annuity, respectively, for a single male retiring at age 65 and for a
female retiring at age 60 (these figures assume the male retiree has a
balance of CP$20 million or approximately US$33,230; the female balance
is CP$56 million or approximately US$90,540). We observe that the pro-
jected PW amount is initially higher than the annuity payment, but within a
decade after retirement, the PW benefit is projected to fall below the
annuity payment.
The role of the minimum pension guarantee
Several aspects of the Chilean retirement system are intended to ensure
that the system pays ‘adequate’ benefits. One benchmark against which
benefits are valued is the ‘minimum pension guarantee’ (MPG), set by the
federal government as a target minimum monthly nominal income value.
This amount is inflation-updated annually and is higher for older retirees.
For instance, the MPG value11 in December 2009 for a retiree younger than
age 70 was CP$104,960 per month (~US$209); for those aged 70–74 it was
CP$114,776 (US$229); and for people aged 75+ it was CP$122,451 (US
$244). A time series of MPGs appears in Figure 7.6, where it can be seen
that this is generally higher than the national minimum monthly earnings
level, and in fact it is equivalent to about one-fourth of the national average
pay of contributors into the pension system.12
In terms of the payout choices, the worker retiring at the normal age who
takes a PW may receive a benefit set by the formula in equation (1), but if
this benefit falls below the MPG, he may request a higher payout rate which
will naturally reduce his balance more quickly. In the event that he runs out
of money, the government will top up his benefit to the MPG amount only
if the worker had a minimum of twenty years of contributions into the
system and his total old-age income falls below the MPG (SAFP 2010). As
Arenas et al. (2008) show, however, this is a relatively stringent criterion.
Currently, many retirees who were credited for service under the
old PAYGO system may have sufficient years of service, but it has been
estimated that no more than half of future retirees will be likely to attain
this twenty years of service goal.13 If the PW is taken at the early retirement
age, then the benefit would be at least 50 percent of his average salary in the
last ten years he paid into the system or 110 percent of the MPG (rising
to 70 and 150 percent, respectively, by 2010).
If the worker annuitizes at the normal retirement age, he must allocate at
least enough of his balance to a fixed real annuity such that his benefit is at
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Figure 7.5 Phased withdrawal and annuity payments in Unidad de Formento (UF)
units: simulation over the life cycle. Panel (A): single male who retires at age 65 (no
dependents); Panel (B): single female who retires at age 60 (no dependents).
Note : Pension balance of UF962 (~US$33,230 in 2008) for men and UF2632 (~US
$109,925 in 2009) for women. Source : Superintendencia de Pensiones (2010a) and
actual SCOMP quotes for life annuity.
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least equal to the MPG. If he retires early, he must purchase an annuity that
exceeds 50 percent of his average salary in the last ten years he paid into the
system or 110 percent of the MPG (rising to 70 and 150 percent, respec-
tively, by 2010). Annuity benefits may be either fixed or variable; in prac-
tice, most pay a real fixed payment (expressed in UF) though the variable
benefits have some portion devoted to a fixed real benefit with another
portion linked to some index (such as a money market or stock index); in
the latter case, the fixed part must amount to at least a fraction of the
worker’s preretirement pay.
It is also worth nothing that the government guarantee covers all of the
MPG plus 75 percent of the excess of the annuity value over the MPG, with
a maximum payment of 45 UF. The latter means people receiving a
pension higher than MPG face some insolvency risk from the life insurance
company. The higher the pension amount, the higher is the eventual
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Figure 7.6 Time path of Chilean minimum pension guarantee (MPG) levels and
minimum monthly earned income (in Unidad de Fomento). Notes: See Figure 7.5.
MPG1 applies to those less than age 70; MPG2 to those aged 70–75; MPG3 to those
aged 75 and older. The minimummonthly earned income is set by the government
as the lowest salary a formal sector worker may earn. Source: Authors’ calculations
based on Superintendencia de Pensiones (2010a).
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benefit reduction in case of insolvency. For this reason, at retirement,
people are provided not only annuity bids but also company ratings infor-
mation.
Since the system’s inception, there has been only one life insurer bank-
ruptcy; at that time, the regulator undertook provisional intervention until
the beneficiaries were assigned to another life insurance company. The
regulator then ran an initial auction in March 2006 but it was redone as
only one offer was received; the second auction inOctober 2006 received two
bids. In the tender, Euroamerica S.A. offered to continue to pay the full
pensions to retirees for 124 months,14 for US$77 million in equity. After that
period, participants would receive the guarantee from the government.
Benefit takeup patterns
It is of interest to explore the time path of retirement benefit takeup
patterns. Figure 7.7 shows the time path of people purchasing annuities
versus taking the PW: in the 1990s, the number of people who elected the
annuity began to rise, and it exceeded the number selecting PW benefits.
Figure 7.8 shows average payments that people received according to
the payment method they elected. These trends show no important differ-
ence between the average payment for people who purchased an annuity at
either the normal retirement (NR) or early retirement (ER) age. There is,
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Figure 7.7 Time path of annuities purchased (RV) and phased withdrawal benefits
(RP) elected in the Chilean pension system. Source : Authors’ calculations based on
Superintendencia de Pensiones (2010a).
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however, a significant difference between those who elect the PW at the
normal age (PWNR) and people who select the PW at the early retirement
age (PWER). That is, the average early PW amount actually paid may
exceed the normal PW value, inasmuch as those who retire early to start
receiving pension benefits must satisfy higher balance requirements. As a
result, low-income people who have not accumulated much in their pen-
sion funds have little opportunity to take early retirement payments, as a
rule. It is for this reason that the normal retirement age PW amount will
be expected to be the lowest payout, on average, and likely very close to
the MPG.
Understanding the Chilean annuity market
During the early days of the Chilean pension system and throughout the
1990s, a substantial amount of peoples’ retirement accounts was charged by
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Figure 7.8 Time path of Chilean pension values according to payout method
elected. Notes: AN corresponds to the value of the annuity purchased at the normal
retirement age; AE corresponds to value of the early retirement annuity; PWN refers
to the value of a phased withdrawal benefit taken at the normal retirement age;
PWE refers to the value of the phased withdrawal taken prior to the normal age.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Superintendencia de Pensiones (2010a).
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intermediaries in the form of commissions. Figure 7.9 depicts the time path
of front-loaded commissions charged by life insurers over time, which rose
to around 6 percent of retiree balances in 2000. In response to the per-
ceived high rate of charges, policymakers began to draft a law that they
hoped would hold down commissions. The policy debate took a decade to
bear fruit with a draft law emerging in 2001 and the final law passed by the
Congress in 2004. Initially, a maximum commission of 2.5 percent of the
individual’s balance could be charged; this was then lowered to 2 percent in
2008. This regulation is believed to have had an important impact in
bringing down commissions, as is clear from Figure 7.9.
In addition to the cap imposed on annuity commissions, this reform
also established a system for retirees to obtain anonymous bids via an
online offer and quotation system (known as SCOMP, its Spanish acro-
nym). This system was introduced as an electronic competitive market
for all those workers who could obtain pension quotes. Specifically, the
AFPs and the life insurers receive the same information about each
person requesting a quote, including the retiree’s age, sex, balance,
and any beneficiaries. The main goal of the system was to increase
competition and enhance transparency for consumers (Valdes Prieto
2005).
Those who request a price quote via this system and purchase an annuity
can elect to do so directly, or they may engage a life insurer, broker, or
financial adviser in which case they can pay up to 2.5 percent of their
pension balance to such an intermediary. The operation of the SCOMP
system may be summarized as follows:
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Figure 7.9 Time path of commissions for annuity sales in Chile. Source: Authors’
calculations based on Superintendencia de Valores (2010b).
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 A member initiates the retirement process by informing his AFP of his
intention to claim benefits (this can be either via an agent or over the
internet). The AFP issues a certificate reporting the member’s balance,
and the member then requests premium quotes from his AFP, a life
insurer, or any broker licensed to work with SCOMP.
 The affiliate may request up to three quotes for each certificate issued by
the AFP.
 After processing and certifying the validity of the request, the system
sends information to the pension benefit providers who in turn submit
their offers to the system. These are then fed to the member and they are
valid for fifteen days.
Worth emphasizing is that the SCOMP system is only informative; that is,
each retiree decides his own course of action. He may select any of the
offers provided, request additional quotes, negotiate with a provider sepa-
rately from the SCOMP offers (with the requirement that this external
offer cannot be lower than the benefit amount offered by this provider
via the SCOMP), or request that SCOMP carry out an auction on his behalf
in which case he must take the lowest price offer. To date, the services of
the SCOMP platform have been used for approximately 142,000 retirees
with an average of 1.3 requests per member since inception in August 2004
(see Tables 7.2 and 7.3). This implies that 81 percent of requests were
accepted by the affiliate or pension beneficiary. In practice, it appears
that the most popular way to access SCOMP is via the AFPs, who advise
39 percent of the purchasers. Brokers, who represent 32 percent of the
market, can also obtain a price quote on the retiree’s behalf, and life insurers
account for 29 percent of the requests.
Table 7.2 Time path of requests for annuity quotes under the Chilean SCOMP
system
Channel (% of total)
Year
Number
requesting
Average number
of requests
Accepted
requests Broker
Life
insurer AFP
2004 14,426 1.20 9,849 40.75 27.91 31.35
2005 33,714 1.29 28,294 36.58 25.19 38.23
2006 29,154 1.28 23,146 38.95 26.66 34.40
2007 37,606 1.36 32,524 40.20 27.79 32.01
2008 44,173 1.30 27,260 33.81 26.95 39.24
2009 33,356 1.20 20,955 7.01 41.16 51.83
Total 192,429 1.29 142,028 32.20 29.30 38.50
Source: Authors’ calculations of data from Superintendencia de Valores (2010c); see text.
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The evidence also indicates that 60 percent of people selected the high-
est benefit, or best monetary offer, provided by the bidders, and the ratio
rises to 80 percent if we consider the highest three monetary offers gener-
ated. Though this could be interpreted as savvy purchasing behavior, it
must be acknowledged that high benefit levels are not the only consider-
ation. Insurers differ according to their risk classifications, so it is difficult
to compare a high benefit payment monetary offer from a lower ranked
firm with a lower benefit and a more highly regarded firm.
Further analysis of monetary quotes indicates that takeup rates vary
according to the channel used to access the system (Figure 7.10). Specifi-
cally, people who referred their decision to brokers elected the highest
payout 75 percent of the time; the ratio was 43 percent when the retiree
used his AFP for advice, and only 3 percent when the life insurer was
consulted. This could indicate that brokers are actually helpful in assisting
people’s decision-making. A possible explanation for the AFP’s poor per-
formance as a channel is related to its lack of incentives during the retire-
ment phase. That is, an AFP participates actively during the worker’s
accumulation phase, registering contributions, investing, and managing
the account; on the other hand, they receive no commission for giving
advice about payout products. The fact that so few people obtain the high-
est payout product when consulting a life insurer may be due to the fact
that agents have an incentive to capture customers once they are contacted.
Many have deemed the SCOMP system a success, but buying an annuity is
still not a simple task. That is, the SCOMP-generated reports can be ten
pages long with multiple numbers and calculations about payments under
different payout structures (e.g., simple annuity, annuity with a guaranteed
period, etc.). This information seems to be quite daunting for those
seeking to shop annuity products at retirement. Furthermore, recent
surveys show that people are not well informed about the pension system
and may lack the financial literacy to make sensible financial choices
Table 7.3 Annuity quotes accepted in Chile based on ranking of benefit offered
Year
Ranking 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Total
Best quote (%) 66.40 63.42 61.96 63.32 57.56 45.81 62.49
Second-best quote (%) 15.50 15.42 14.15 13.53 14.54 14.10 14.44
Third-best quote (%) 7.52 7.31 7.37 7.36 7.70 9.52 7.34
Other (%) 10.59 13.85 16.53 15.80 20.20 30.56 15.74
Total number 6,640 18,351 16,193 19,711 20,450 17,916 77,300
Source: Authors’ calculations of data from Superintendencia de Valores (2010c); see text.
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(Arenas et al. 2008; Mitchell et al. 2009). As a result, retirees are likely to
continue requesting the services of intermediaries, which in turn reduces
their pension levels due to the commissions charged.
A further consideration is that it is virtually impossible for people to ‘learn
by doing’ as most people undertake this once in a lifetime. The decision
requires the purchaser to sign a contract in which he transfers his pension
balance to a life insurer in exchange for a cash flow until the purchaser’s
death. For this reason, the Chilean pension supervisory authority has focused
on enhancing information flow and strengthening the platform for annuity
bids. Suppliers also benefit from SCOMP. While one-third of retirees do
request online quotes directly, thus avoiding paying fees to intermediaries,
only 12 percent finalize the process without paying any commissions
(Reyes and Stewart 2008). This reinforces the notion that consumers
lack financial knowledge for making such a momentous and irreversible
decision. For this reason, people seek out and pay advisers, and also for
this reason, the regulator continues to seek ways to reduce commissions
paid to intermediaries.
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Figure 7.10 Proportion of Chilean AFP member retirees electing the lowest cost
annuity quote by access channel utilized. Source : Authors’ calculations based on
Superintendencia de Pensiones (2010a).
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Are Chilean annuities attractive?
Earlier studies research has noted that adverse selection is likely when
retirees have the option to annuitize (Mitchell et al. 1999; Finkelstein and
Poterba 2004), due to an asymmetry of information between the life
insurer and the individual seeking to buy the annuity. Specifically, retirees
may have better information about their health conditions and thus about
life expectancy compared to the information available to the insurer. For
instance, people who believe their mortality probability is lower than aver-
age will value offered annuities more than people who believe their mor-
tality is higher. Life insurers in Chile are not allowed to discriminate
between buyers using health tests, medical records, or familiar history –
in fact, they only permit age and sex to be used to classify purchasers. Of
course, in fact, mortality patterns do differ across segments of the popula-
tion for various reasons (McCarthy and Mitchell 2010), and mortality
patterns can also change over time as a result of improvements that affect
life expectancies of one group more than another (new drugs, new vac-
cines, etc.). For this reason, it is of interest to ask whether there is adverse
selection in the Chilean annuity market, and if so, how important this
phenomenon might be.
One way to analyze adverse selection is to simply plot population and
annuity mortality patterns, which we do in Figure 7.11.15 The evidence
strongly suggests that, in Chile, the male population does die earlier than
those persons who purchase annuities, supporting the notion that people
who expect to live longer purchase annuities that allow them to smooth
consumption and avoid the longevity risk, and the effect is even stronger
for women. Thus, there is some degree of adverse selection in the Chilean
annuity market since people who are expected to live longer are more
likely to purchase annuities.
We quantify these differences by computing the A/E ratio comparing
population and annuitant mortality patterns. Specifically, we compare the
number of deaths in the Chilean male population with a given age struc-
ture using one table, versus the number of deaths in the annuitant group
using the annuity mortality table. The formula for the A/E method is:
A
E
¼
P
xwxq

xP
xwxqx
 100 ð2Þ
where qx is the probability associated with the table in question that an
individual of age x dies, and qx is the corresponding probability for the base
table; wx are the weights which are set with value w65 = 100,000 and wx = wx1
(1qx1). In the Chilean case, we see that for males the ratio is 84.8 and for
females, 66.1. By way of comparison, McCarthy and Mitchell (2010) find a
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Figure 7.11 Distribution of age at death of Chilean population and annuity pur-
chasers conditional on attaining age 25. Panel (A): males; Panel (B): females.
Source : Authors’ calculations based on INE (2004).
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smaller number for US men, 65.3 but a relatively larger ratio for women,
73.6. Thus, we interpret this result as showing that male and female annui-
tants in Chile live longer than the population, but the women live relatively
much longer than in the United States. As a result, it would be reasonable
to conjecture that women would find life annuities relatively more appeal-
ing than men.
Another way to judge whether Chilean annuity markets are appealing
is to compute the so-called money’s worth ratio (MWR), or the dis-
counted expected present value of the lifetime payment stream relative
to the premium, conditional on survival. This calculation requires that
one employs not just a period but a cohortized mortality table and term
structure for interest rates (see Mitchell et al. 1999). Also, the formula
must take into account whether the person purchased a single annuity or
joint annuity (compulsory for married males). In addition, in Chile, life
insurers also promise a funeral benefit of 15 UF in case of the purcha-
ser’s death. Accordingly, the MWR for a single life annuitant may be
defined as:
MWRi ¼
Ai
P12ðwxÞ
t¼dþ1
t px
ð1þit Þt
 
þ F
P
ð3Þ
where A is the monthly annuity payment in UF, w is the ultimate age in the
mortality table, tPx is the probability that a life aged x is still alive at time t, d
is the number of deferment months chosen in the annuity, it is the interest
rate used for discounting future payments, F is the funeral benefits, and P is
the premium paid to the life insurance company. Similarly, the MWR for a
joint annuity may be defined as:
MWRi ¼
ðAi
P12ðwxÞ
t¼dþ1
t pxþ0:6ð1t px Þt py
ð1þit Þt Þ þ F
P
ð4Þ
where almost all the variables are the same as before, but now we need to
add the death probability of the beneficiary (tPy).
16 In case of guarantee
periods, the term tPx takes the value 1 in the periods covered by the
guarantee.
Table 7.4 replicates some of the MW computations carried out by prior
analysts, at the end of the 1990s and early in the 2000s, and Table 7.5
reports our own updated estimates for the years 2005–8. Overall, and
somewhat different from other countries,17 we find that MWR tends to
exceed 1 in Chile and the advantage appears to be rising slightly over time.
This suggests that annuity buyers are receiving a relatively generous flow of
payments given their premium payments, which explains some of the
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product’s appeal. In results not reported here (but available on request),
we examine an OLS regression model relating individual MWRs to partici-
pants’ age, account balance at purchase, sex and marital status, and other
factors. We find that MWRs rise with age, pension balance, and for those
who buy deferred rather than immediate products. Single men and women
have lower MWRs than do married women, indicating that some of the
annuity value derives from what appear to be more than actuarially fair
benefits to married women.
The relatively high MWRs we find are also consistent with Rocha and
Rudolph (2010), and they are grounds for concern in that insurers selling
these products are unlikely to make a positive profit over time as in
expectation they will pay out more than they earn. Yet another way to
look at the results is that our computations use a risk-free discount rate
which enhances the expected present value of the income flow (a long-
term government bond rate). If, instead, we used a higher corporate bond
Table 7.4 Money’s worth ratios for Chilean payout annuities derived in prior
studies
James et al. (2006)a Rocha and Thorburn (2006)
1999 2003 1999 2003
Male aged 55 0.98 0.98 0.98 1.05
Male aged 65 — 1.01 1.00 1.07
Female aged 55 0.96 0.93 0.99 1.05
Female aged 60 — 0.96 1.02 1.08
Joint life 1.00 1.01 1.00 1.05
Mortality table used RV-98 RV-98 RV-04 RV-04
a Computed for a balance of UF1000.
Source: Authors’ calculations from cited sources; all computations use the risk-free rate.
Table 7.5 Updated money’s worth ratios for Chilean payout annuities
Demographic Average 2005–8
Male aged 55 1.07
Male aged 65 1.07
Female aged 55 1.09
Female aged 65 1.11
Joint life 1.11
Source: Authors’ calculations from Superintendencia de Valores (2010a, 2010b, 2010c); all computations
use the risk-free rate.
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rate, annuity payouts would be reduced as would MWRs (note that the PW
payout would also decline). Accordingly, while benefits seem relatively
generous under conventional assumptions, it is likely that these are risky
in the long run.
Conclusion
One of the most interesting features of the Chilean pension system is that
approximately two-thirds of all retirees purchase annuities, a very different
result than the evidence reported in other countries. In our view, this
phenomenon is attributable to several factors specific to Chile:
1. Generous annuity payments. As we have shown, MWRs for the Chilean
pension system are high in comparison with international experience
and appear to be rising.
2. Information transparency in the annuity bidding process. The transparency and
ease of the SCOMP online mechanism has evidently made it easier for
retirees to find better information on annuity premiums than was feasible
in the past. In addition, AFPs are now required to issue a list of people
nearing retirement age to all the pension providers, as a means to boost
competition.
3. Access to early retirement. The Chilean law permits people to retire early if
their pension accruals are substantial enough. Since workers need not
leave the labor force in order to claim their pensions, those who have
sufficient wealth in their AFP accounts will value access to the funds.
Most of these retirees with decent balances will not expect to see their
benefits decline down to the MPG threshold, so they are very likely to
annuitize.
4. Small incentives for the AFPs to promote PW. In Chile, the AFP managers are
mainly paid based on workers’ contributions; they are prohibited from
paying commissions to brokers. Furthermore, AFPs may not charge a
front-end fee to retirees who leave their money with the AFP and take
the PW amounts.18
The fact that the Chilean life annuity market is continuing to grow bodes
well for future retirement security. Nevertheless, some important policy
issues remain to be resolved. One is that the system uses sex-specific
mortality tables to price retirement benefits, and under the current law,
women are able to file as young as age 60. These facts, combined with
women’s generally lower earnings levels, mean that women’s benefits are
relatively low compared to men’s. By contrast, in many European nations
and in the United States, retirement ages are the same for both men and
women, and unisex tables apply to the benefit formulas (Bertranou 2001).
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If a common mortality table were used for Chilean calculations, men’s
benefits would fall and women’s would rise. Therefore, male retirees taking
the PW would deplete their pension balances later and females earlier.
Berstein and Tokman (2005) suggest that men’s annuity values would fall
by 5 percent, while women’s would rise by the same percentage. The same
authors estimate that raising women’s retirement age to 65 would boost
their annuities by one-third to 47 percent.
Another issue is that, until recently, poverty benefits under the first pillar
were rationed. That is, some poor retirees were unable to qualify for
poverty-based old-age income support benefits due to lack of funding for
the program. As a result, risk-averse consumers would have been likely to
demand an annuity to help smooth old-age consumption, as long as the
chance of welfare support was not 100 percent. Also, the MPG benefit level
was relatively low, and to receive this benefit, people had to meet strict
eligibility requirements (e.g., contributing for twenty years into the sys-
tem). Both factors would have raised the attractiveness of annuitizing
instead of relying on PW payouts.
Nevertheless, the Chilean government has recently enacted several
pension system reforms seeking to enhance coverage and boost first-pillar
benefits (Godoy 2008; Arenas 2010). Specifically, access to the minimum
benefit was made easier and the twenty-year contribution requirement has
been dropped. Additionally, the minimum old-age benefit level was
increased for those with low or no contribution histories. These reforms
are likely to reduce the demand for annuitization in the future, since more
people will be able to avail themselves of the social safety net in old age. In
addition, the insurance sector is paying what appears to be quite high
benefits in exchange for the premiums charged, a pattern that may be
challenged as the financial turmoil of 2008–9 takes its toll on insurance
company investments.
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Notes
1 This section draws on Arenas et al. (2008) which cites numerous historical
references to the development and growth of the Chilean pensions system over
the last three decades.
2 The public defined-benefit entity that administered the old PAYGO defined-
benefit program was closed to new entrants by the 1980 reform, but it continues
to pay those retirees who remained in the old program at the time of the reform;
it also pays ‘recognition bonds’ at retirement to those who moved to the new
system and received credit for prior contributions.
3 It also provides life insurance and disability benefits as part of the mandatory pro-
gram.
4 Mandatory system contributions are capped at an earnings ceiling of approxi-
mately US$2,000 a month; fewer than 5 percent of AFP contributors earn over
that ceiling.
5 Strictly speaking, they have other two choices from the combination of these
modalities according to recent changes in the regulation, but few people elect
these combinations.
6 The survivorship benefit was made sex-neutral in the most recent 2009 reforms.
7 This is similar to the 1/E[T] rule implemented by the US Internal Revenue
Service, when determining how quickly the retiree must spend down his 401(k)
plan; see Horneff et al. (2007).
8 As of 3/10, a UF is equal to CP$20,998, or about US$40.33 (Banco Central de
Chile 2010).
9 The formula for the benefit is
Guaranteed pension ¼ Minf45UF;MPGþ 0:75ðAnnuityMPGÞg
10 Information taken from Superintendencia de Pensiones (2010a) and monetary
units were converted into US dollars using data from Banco Central de Chile
(2010).
11 For the reader’s convenience, US$1 = CP$501 as of December 2009.
12 Superintendencia de Pensiones (2010b).
13 Since the calculation takes into account one’s final ten years of contributions,
this means that benefits are low for people claiming benefits after a long
unemployment period or with many zero-contribution periods. To disincentivize
early retirement, the regulator has limited to sixteen the number of zero-contri-
bution months that can be counted in the retiree’s final decade of contributions.
14 From February 2008 to May 2018.
15 Information collected from The National Institute of Statistics – Chile (INE)
where mortality tables are aggregated over five-year periods and disaggregated
using the methodology in Ruiz (2010).
16 Here, we assume that the only potential beneficiary is a spouse; no children are
assumed as beneficiaries.
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17 See for instance Doyle et al. (2004), James et al. (2006), Rocha and Rudolph
(2010), and Thorburn et al. (2007).
18 All AFPs charge a fee of 1.25 percent on the pension balance in order to provide
pension payouts.
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